Sudan: A History in Three-Part Disharmony (Part II)

by Michelle

Published October 06, 2008 @ 03:00AM PT

“Khartoum will never go back to being a secular capital.”

In Episode 2 of our three-part tour of Sudanese history, we turn to newly-imposed dictator General Omar al-Bashir and his penchant for violence and oppression. The Second Civil War with the South reached even greater levels of brutality under his direction, and the genocide in Darfur is a direct outgrowth of this period, as are the patterns of violence and ethnic cleansing.

After taking power in a military coup in 1989, General Omar al-Bashir was ruthless with all opponents, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, declaring, “Anyone who betrays the nation does not deserve the honor of living.” He imposed incredibly strict Sharia law in 1991, mandated the use of Arabic in education throughout the country (much to the dismay of non-Arabs, to say the least), and provided support for known international terrorists, including Osama bin Laden.

Al-Bashir also continued the Second Civil War with increased brutality, calling for jihad and favoring complete destruction of the region rather than seek political settlement with the non-Arab rebel groups in the South. To protect the oil fields, discovered in mostly Nuer and Dinka territory in 1978, the government initiated a campaign of ethnic cleansing. By 2001, oil revenue accounted for 40% of Sudan’s economy, and military spending increased 96% between 1998 and 2000.

As with his predecessors, he exacerbated conflicts between rival Southern rebel factions, who disagreed over end goal of the war: a unified secular Sudan, or Southern independence. In August 1991, a Nuer guerrilla commander, Riek Machar, acting with the support of Khartoum, tried to seize control of the SPLM, led by Dinka John Garang. Tens of thousands were killed in what amounted to a secondary war.

The world finally notices…

By 2002, 2 million were dead and 4 million displaced as a result of the civil war. Several peace initiatives in the 1990s were doomed form the start, as they lacked the honest participation of Khartoum, which had no intention of making concessions to the Southerners. However, the combination of Khartoum’s support for terrorism, brutality in the South, and severe oppression of all opposition started to pique international attention, and the US House of Representatives passed the Sudan Peace Act in May 2001. The Act set up a strict package of sanctions if Khartoum failed to cooperate with international peace efforts—after the attacks of the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, Bashir finally started to cooperate.

President Bush signed the Sudan Peace Act and sent Senator John Danforth as a special envoy to Sudan, saying “For nearly two decades, the government of Sudan has waged a brutal and shameful war against its own people. And this isn’t right, and this must stop. The government has targeted civilians for violence and terror. It permits and encourages slavery. And the responsibility to end the war is on their shoulders. They must now seek the peace, and we want to help.” High-level U.S. diplomatic engagement bolstered efforts led by Kenya through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) since 1994, and the renewed push for an agreement also included close collaboration with the U.K., Norway, and Italy.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9, 2005, and, among other things, includes:

• The right to self-determination for the South, which will be decided via referendum. The CPA mandates a six-year interim period, starting in January 2005, before a referendum can be held.
• Islamic Sharia law in the North, and secular governance in the South. (This means that 5 million non-Muslims in the North still live under Sharia law.) No consideration is given to a united secular Sudan.

By October 2005, under a new constitution, a regional government was set up in the South and the central government in Khartoum included SPLM representation.

The peace process was initiated by the US, and only included the government and the SPLM. Other relevant parties were entirely left out of process, and thus the agreement did nothing to resolve the animosities between rival Southern groups.