Obama on Darfur: Options and Obstacles

by Michelle

categories: Darfur & Sudan, Obama Administration

Published May 06, 2009 @ 06:09PM PT

The ENOUGH Project, Save Darfur Coalition, and Genocide Intervention Network released a "Blueprint for Peace" with a series of policy options --- both carrots and sticks --- for the Obama administration's approach to conflict resolution in Sudan:

"On the pressures side, there seems to be an erroneous belief that there are no meaningful pressures left to use. We have spelled out a number of points of leverage that are available. That reflects our view that the Sudanese government responds much more directly to pressures than they do to incentives. Until now, most sticks have been unilateral and have had limited effect on the regime's calculations. Substantial and focused multilateral pressures have not been tried and should form the basis of the new administration's strategy. Clearly, equally robust pressures and incentives should be developed and applied impartially to the rebel factions and SPLM to the degree to which their actions may warrant these measures."

In fact, the primary obstacle to pursuing an effective carrots-and-sticks approach with Khartoum seems to be less a matter of Khartoum's response to any given measure and more of the international community's inability to craft a coordinated approach to the violent regime. The report lists a series of available options that could be effective, but their implementation hinges on multi-lateral cooperation. The key question moving forward, then, is can Obama and his team rally the necessary support for an effective approach?

I have a few questions for the author's of the report --- asked not out of some sense of snarky rhetorical superiority, but out of a genuine desire to learn more about the obstacles standing in the way of the available options.

• Isolate Bashir: Khartoum's warmongering hasn't alienated Chinese and Arab investments yet (or at least, doesn't seem to have done enough), and predictions about the possibility of international and domestic political isolation of Bashir have been made before. Are there specific examples that can explain why this might be a possibility, or is it mostly hypothetical at this point?
• Support the elections and referendum: Given that Khartoum is quite crafty at subverting international attempts to do anything in this country (implement the CPA, deliver humanitarian aid, etc), and even as a de facto veto power over the presence of UNAMID peacekeepers, what would need to be done to ensure that international support for free and fair elections was actually effective?
• Re-contextualize counterterrorism cooperation: This seems like an important step that the US could take unilaterally. As ENOUGH pointed out recently, the fact that Sudan is both listed as a state sponsor of terrorism and then hailed for its cooperation, all the in the same document, is a tad absurd. What does Sudan gain from this "cooperation" that it would not what to lose if Obama took a different stance?
• Expand the arms embargo and effectively end offensive military flights: Efforts to accomplish both of these aims have thus far been unsuccessful. What currently stand in the way that needs to be addressed for either of these to be accomplished?
• Remove Sudan's veto over UNAMID: What would keep the government from Sudan as seeing UNAMID, if not in Darfur on their terms/invitation, from seeing the peacekeepers as a hostile foreign force, and responding accordingly? UNAMID desperately needs to be fully deployed and equipped in order to fulfill its current mandate for civilian protection --- would they then be able to protect themselves, if necessary?

I encourage everyone to read the entire report --- it presents an excellent overview (it is just a policy memo, not a dissertation) of Obama's policy options for Sudan.

[Photo from 2006: The-Senator Barack Obama is interviewed by La Voix du Ouaddai reporter Issaka Allafouza at the Abéché airport in Chad on his trip to Guereda where UNHCR is supporting Darfur refugees.]