Is Darfur a Genocide? (No Delusions of Simplicity.)

by Michelle

categories: Darfur & Sudan, Is It Genocide, War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity

Published March 03, 2009 @ 06:57PM PT

This is the third and final installment of the series --- see Part I and Part II.

So if the ICC doesn't approve the genocide charge, will the activists drop it?

Not likely.

If the pre-trial panel does not issue an arrest warrant for Bashir on the genocide charge, it simply means that the prosecutor did not present convincing enough evidence of genocidal intent --- it does not necessarily mean that said intent is nonexistent. Furthermore, a court is not the end-all-be-all of definitions: It will be unfortunate if Ocampo is not able to prosecute Bashir for genocide, but significant enough support exists among established policy, academic, and other circles to justify referring to Darfur as a genocide.

Additionally, as Save Darfur President Jerry Fowler notes, Ocampo wasn't able to carry out his investigation under ideal conditions:

"One thing that we have to keep in mind is that the prosecutor was operating under very difficult circumstances.  He could not go to Darfur to do his investigation. So it is somewhat difficult to put together a case when you can't visit the crime scene.  But he talked to many, many refugees who had left Darfur, and collected evidence that way."

So investigators couldn't exactly gain access to Bashir's personal files and look for a smoking gun memo or email. ("Oh, the files are in the computer." ...Sorry, I couldn't resist.)

Like Steve Bloomfield, I've also heard quite a few people with far more insight into the ICC express serious doubts about Ocampo's investigation. I'm in no position to offer comment there --- I'm not a lawyer, and have no clue what the judges will decide. But as I said, I will be disappointed if the genocide charge is thrown out, but do not think it's the final word on the debate.

In response to Mr. Bloomfield...

Steve responded to Part I of this series in a post this morning, and a few points beg a response. Steve distinguishes between the peak of the government's violent campaign in Darfur, from 2003 - 2005, and the current situation, and disagrees that genocide is ongoing in Darfur.

My thoughts:

First, as I wrote in Part II, a compelling case can be made that the current character of the violence fits the bill of Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention, which identifies as an act of genocide:

"Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."

The violence and displacement of civilians may not be of the same scale as the first two years of the conflict, but civilians are still systematically targeted by the government as part of its counterinsurgency campaign against Darfur rebel groups. As a result, nearly half of the region's population remains displaced --- and government severely restricts and impedes humanitarian assistance and international peacekeeping efforts. To restate a point made by Ocampo, which I quoted in Part 2:

"[The ongoing] hindering of humanitarian assistance is part of the genocide, because the consequence is that people are dying. Five thousand are dying each month, and we are presenting that as a humanitarian crisis. It's not; it's a crime."

I agree.

Second, Steve might be right. Perhaps the current government campaign in Darfur cannot be accurately described as genocide, even if earlier stage can. But this seems a bit like splitting hairs: If the government of Sudan committed acts of genocide against Darfuris from 2003 - 2005, can that genocidal intent really be separated from its actions in the present day? Can one really compartmentalize two phases of a conflict and address them as if they are two separate issues? If genocidal intent was present in 2003, it still factors into current the current grappling with justice and conflict resolution --- it is, indeed, as Steve writes, "about what sort of solutions are imposed."

Which brings me to my final point of dissent: I agree with Steve's point that "genocide is about motive, not numbers of dead," that it is "more than semantics," and have written on that very issue several times in this blog. I consider myself to be a bit more reserved when using the G-word than many --- and I've taken heat for it, especially regarding Gaza and Sri Lanka. The designation of "genocide" is often used incorrectly as a rallying cry in the face of horror, as it is widely perceived as the worst atrocity that can be committed.

What I take issue with is here:

"The issue of timing, though it sounds petty, is important. If a genocide is taking place then it makes sense to argue that the genocidal government needs to be overthrown. But if what is happening now is actually a messy war with many players then simply overthrowing Bashir is not going to solve Darfur's problems."

And, sort of, here:

"[Genocide] is the worst atrocity that can be committed. It's the Holocaust, it's Rwanda, it's Cambodia. It's rows of skulls and gas chambers. Hundred of thousands, possibly millions dead."

Is it not possible to imagine that a genocide could take place in the midst of a mess war with many players? That what started out looking more like commonly known cases of genocide --- the Holocaust, Rwanda --- devolved into a complicated and chaotic mix of actors and motivations does not preclude the possibility that genocide could be ongoing. If genocide is dependent on motive, the setting or scenario of its occurrence can vary widely. Current and future genocides may not always follow the pattern of those past.

Furthermore, if genocide only occurred in the past, I do not think this diminishes the argument for Bashir's removal --- nor do I think that anyone is arguing that Bashir's removal will solve Darfur's problems. But it would be a step in the right (though still fraught with complications) direction.

And, as I wrote in a previous post, and actually got Michael Kleinman to agree with, the activist movement is far, far more than tshirt slogans and rallying cries --- the efforts of activists are coupled with less visible, high level advocacy by incredibly intelligent policy analysts, who understand the complexities and trade offs of the conflict.

No one is looking for simple solutions, or has any delusion that such things exist.

En fin

We'll find out soon enough (tomorrow, to be exact), if the pre-trial panel at the ICC thinks that Ocampo presented convincing enough evidence to even issue an arrest warrant for Bashir on the genocide charge.

But at the very, very least, the issue is complicated enough that Darfur activists do not deserve to have the "this isn't even genocide" card used against them so dismissively.